Abstract. A perfect algebraic immune function is a Boolean function with perfect immunity against algebraic and fast algebraic attacks. The main results are that for a perfect algebraic immune balanced function the number of input variables is one more than a power of two; for a perfect algebraic immune unbalanced function the number of input variables is a power of two. Also the Carlet-Feng functions on 2 s + 1 variables and the modified Carlet-Feng functions on 2 s variables are shown to be perfect algebraic immune functions. Furthermore, it is shown that a perfect algebraic immune function behaves good against probabilistic algebraic attacks as well.
Introduction
The study of the cryptanalysis of the filter and combination generators of stream ciphers based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) has resulted in a wealth of cryptographic criteria for Boolean functions, such as balancedness, high algebraic degree, high nonlinearity, high correlation immunity and so on. An overview of cryptographic criteria for Boolean functions with extensive bibliography is given in [5] .
In recent years, algebraic and fast algebraic attacks [1, 7, 8] have been regarded as the most successful attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers. These attacks cleverly use overdefined systems of multivariable nonlinear equations to recover the secret key. Algebraic attacks make use of the equations by multiplying a non-zero function of low degree, while fast algebraic attacks make use of the equations by linear combination.
Thus the algebraic immunity (AI), the minimum algebraic degree of annihilators of f or f + 1, was introduced by W. Meier et al. [22] to measure the ability of Boolean functions to resist algebraic attacks. It was shown by N. Courtois and W. Meier [7] that maximum AI of n-variable Boolean functions is n 2 . The properties and constructions of Boolean functions with maximum AI are researched in a large number of papers, e.g., [10, 17, 18, 6, 27, 28] .
A preprocessing of fast algebraic attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers, which use a Boolean function f : GF (2) n → GF (2) as the filter or combination generator, is to find a function g of small degree such that the multiple gf has degree not too large [8] . The resistance against fast algebraic attacks is not covered by algebraic immunity [9, 2, 19] . At Eurocrypt 2006, F. Armknecht et al. [2] introduced an effective algorithm for determining the immunity against fast algebraic attacks, and showed that a class of symmetric Boolean functions (the majority functions) have poor resistance against fast algebraic attacks despite their resistance against algebraic attacks. Later M. Liu et al. [19] stated that almost all the symmetric functions including these functions with good algebraic immunity behavior badly against fast algebraic attacks. In [25] P. Rizomiliotis introduced a method to evaluate the behavior of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks using univariate polynomial representation. However, it is unclear what is maximum immunity to fast algebraic attacks.
In [8] N. Courtois proved that for any pair of positive integers (e, d) such that e+d ≥ n, there is a nonzero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most d. This result reveals an upper bound on maximum immunity to fast algebraic attacks. It implies that the function f has maximum possible resistance against fast algebraic attacks, if for any pair of positive integers (e, d) such that e + d < n and e < n/2, there is no non-zero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most d. Such functions are said to be perfect algebraic immune (PAI) . Note that one can use the fast general attack by splitting the function into two f = h + l with l being the linear part of f [8] . In this case, e equals 1 and d equals the degree of the function f . Thus PAI functions have algebraic degree at least n − 1.
A PAI function also achieves maximum AI. As a consequence, a PAI function has perfect immunity against classical and fast algebraic attacks. Although preventing classical and fast algebraic attacks is not sufficient for resisting algebraic attacks on the augmented function [14] , the resistance against these attacks depends on the update function and tap positions used in a stream cipher and in actual fact it is not a property of the Boolean function.
It is an open question whether there are PAI functions for arbitrary number of input variables. This problem was also noticed in [6] at Asiacrypt 2008. It seems that PAI functions are quite rare. In [6] C. Carlet and K. Feng observed that the Carlet-Feng functions on 9 variables are PAI. One can check that the Carlet-Feng functions on 5 variables are also PAI (see also [12] ). However, no function is shown to be PAI for arbitrary number of variables. On the contrary, M. Liu et al. [19] proved that no symmetric functions are PAI, and Y. Zhang et al. [29] proved that no rotation symmetric functions are PAI for even number (except a power of two) of variables.
In this paper, we study the upper bounds on the immunity to fast algebraic attacks, and solve the above question. The immunity against fast algebraic attacks is related to a matrix thanks to Theorem 1 of [2] . By a simple transformation on this matrix we obtain a symmetric matrix whose elements are the coefficients of the algebraic normal form of a given Boolean function. We improve the upper bounds on the immunity to fast algebraic attacks by proving that the symmetric matrix is singular in some cases. The results are that for an n-variable function, we have: (1) if n is a power of 2 then a PAI function has degree n; (2) if n is one more than a power of 2 then a PAI function has degree n − 1 (which is also balanced); (3) otherwise, the function is not PAI. We then prove that the Carlet-Feng functions, which have degree n − 1, are PAI for n equal to one more than a power of 2, and are almost PAI for the other cases. Also we prove that the modified Carlet-Feng functions, which have degree n, are PAI for n equal to a power of 2, and are almost PAI for the other cases. The results show that our bounds on the immunity to fast algebraic attacks are tight, and that the Carlet-Feng functions are optimal against fast algebraic attacks as well as classical algebraic attacks. In contrast, P. Rizomiliotis [26] determined the immunity of the Carlet-Feng functions against fast algebraic attacks by computing the linear complexity of a sequence, which is infeasible for large n.
At Eurocrypt 2003, N. Courtois and W. Meier [7] described the probabilistic scenario of algebraic attacks as follows:
S4 There exists a non-zero function g of low degree such that gf can be approximated by a function of low degree with probability 1 − ε.
In [3] , A. Braeken and B. Preneel generalized S4 to the two scenarios:
S4a There exists a non-zero function g of low degree such that gf = g on {x | f (x) = 0} with probability 1 − ε. S4b There exists a non-zero function g of low degree such that gf = 0 on {x | f (x) = 1} with probability 1 − ε.
The probability for the scenario S4a is equal to p = 1 − holds for nonzero function g of degree at most r. This result gives an upper bound on the probability for applying probabilistic algebraic attacks. The details can also be found in [20] .
In [24] E. Pasalic claimed that from time complexity point of view deterministic algebraic attacks are in general more efficient than probabilistic ones for practical sizes L (e.g. L = 256) of LFSR in the context of certain LFSR-based stream ciphers under an assumption 1 that the minimum distance of the code derived by shortening Reed-Muller code (which depends on the filter function) meets the GilbertVarshamov (GV) bound. Nevertheless, one should still verify whether the structure of the function itself allows a low-degree approximation that is satisfied with high probability. In [20] , M. Liu et al. gave two examples of filter functions for which probabilistic algebraic attacks outperform deterministic ones for practical sizes of the LFSR in the context of the nonlinear filter generator.
In this paper, based on Carlet's bound, we show that for a filter function with maximum AI probabilistic algebraic attacks are worse than exhaustive search in the context of the nonlinear filter generator if the length of the LFSR is greater than or equal to 46. This does not contradict the results of [20] , since the filter functions shown in [20] do not have maximum AI. Our work shows that a PAI function behaves good against probabilistic algebraic attacks since it has maximum AI. Again, we do not consider probabilistic algebraic attacks on the augmented function here.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some basic concepts are provided. Section 3 presents the improved upper bounds on the immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks while Section 4 shows that the Carlet-Feng functions and their modifications achieve these bounds. Section 5 states that a PAI function has good immunity to probabilistic algebraic attacks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminary
Let F 2 denote the binary field GF (2) and F n 2 the n-dimensional vector space over F 2 . An n-variable Boolean function is a mapping from F n 2 into F 2 . Denote by B n the set of all n-variable Boolean functions. An n-variable Boolean function f can be uniquely represented as its truth table, i.e., a binary string of length 2 n ,
The support of f is given by supp(f ) = {x ∈ F n 2 | f (x) = 1}. The Hamming weight of f , denoted by wt(f ), is the number of ones in the truth table of f . An n-variable function f is said to be balanced if its truth table contains equal number of zeros and ones, that is, wt(f ) = 2 n−1 . The Hamming distance between n-variable functions f and g, denoted by d(f, g), is the number of x ∈ F n 2 at which f (x) = g(x). It is well known that d(f, g) = wt(f + g).
An n-variable Boolean function f can also be uniquely represented as a multivariate polynomial over
called the algebraic normal form (ANF). The algebraic degree of f , denoted by deg(f ), is defined as max{wt(c) | a c = 0}. Let F 2 n denote the finite field GF (2 n ). The Boolean function f considered as a mapping from F 2 n into F 2 can be uniquely represented as
where (1) is called the univariate polynomial representation of the function f . It is well known that f 2 (x) ≡ f (x)(mod x 2 n − x) if and only if a 0 , a 2 n −1 ∈ F 2 and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 n −2, a 2i mod(2 n −1) = a 2 i . The algebraic degree of the function f equals max
Let α be a primitive element of F 2 n . The a i 's of Expression (1) are given by
For more details with regard to the representation of Boolean functions, we refer to [5] . The algebraic immunity of Boolean functions is defined as follows. Maximum algebraic immunity of n-variable Boolean functions is n 2 [7] . Definition 1 [22] The algebraic immunity of a function f ∈ B n , denoted by AI(f ), is defined as
The immunity of f against fast algebraic attacks is related to the degree e of a function g and the degree d of gf with e ≤ d. For an n-variable function f and any positive integer e with e < n/2, there is a non-zero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e [8] . There are several notions about the immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks in previous literatures, such as [15, 23] . The perfect algebraic immune function we define below is actually a Boolean function which is algebraic attack resistant (see [23] ) and has degree at least n − 1. The latter is necessary for perfect algebraic immune function since for a function of degree less than n − 1 the fast general attack uses e = 1 and
Definition 2 Let f be an n-variable Boolean function. The function f is said to be perfect algebraic immune (PAI) if for any positive integers e < n/2, the product gf has degree at least n − e for any non-zero function g of degree at most e.
A PAI function also achieves maximum AI. As a matter of fact, if a function does not achieves maximum AI, then it admits a non-zero function g of degree less than n/2 such that gf = 0 or gf = g, which means that it is not PAI. Therefore PAI functions are the class of Boolean functions perfectly resistant to classical and fast algebraic attacks.
The immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks
In this section, we present the upper bounds on the immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks. We first recall the previous results for determining the immunity against fast algebraic attacks, then state our bounds.
Denote by W i the set {x ∈ F n 2 | wt(x) ≤ i} in lexicographic order and by W i the set {x ∈ F n 2 | wt(x) ≥ i + 1} in reverse lexicographic order. For x ∈ F n 2 , letx = (x 1 + 1, . . . , x n + 1). If x is the j-th element in W e andx ∈ W d , thenx is the j-th element in W d . Here are some additional notational conventions: for y, z ∈ F n 2 , let z ⊂ y be an abbreviation for supp(z) ⊂ supp(y), where supp(x) = {i|x i = 1}, and let
, where ∧ and ∨ are the AND and OR operations respectively. We can see that z ⊂ y if and only if y z = y
2 · · · y zn n = 1. Let g be a function of algebraic degree at most e (e < n/2) such that h = gf has algebraic degree at
be the ANFs of f , g and h respectively. For y ∈ W d , we have h y = 0 and therefore
The above equations on g z 's are homogeneous linear. Denote by V (f ; e, d) the coefficient matrix of the equations, which is a n i=d+1 n i × e i=0 n i matrix with the ij-th element equal to
where y is the i-th element in W d and z is the j-th element in W e . Then f admits no non-zero function g of algebraic degree at most e such that h = gf has algebraic degree at most d if and only if the rank of the matrix V (f ; e, d) equals the number of g z 's which is e i=0 n i , i.e., V (f ; e, d) has full column rank (see also [2, 12] ).
Theorem 1 [2, 12] Let f ∈ B n . Then there exists no non-zero function g of degree at most e such that the product gf has degree at most d if and only if the matrix V (f ; e, d) has full column rank.
Remark 1. The theorem shows that AI(f ) > e if and only if the matrix V (f ; e, e) has full column rank (since AI(f ) > e if and only if there exists no non-zero function g of degree at most e such that h = gf has degree at most e). Then AI(f ) = Now we show that performing some column operations on the matrix V (f ; e, d) creates a matrix with f c 's as its elements.
Proof. Note that c ∪ z = y if and only if c ⊂ y, z ⊂ y and y ⊂ c ∪ z, that is, y c = 1, y z = 1 and (c ∪ z) y = 1. By (4) we have
By Lemma 2 we know that the matrix V (f ; e, d) can be transformed into a matrix, denoted by W (f ; e, d), with the ij-th element equal to Remark
Next we concentrate on the upper bounds on the immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks. As mentioned in Section 2, for an n-variable function f and any positive integer e with e < n/2, there is a non-zero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e. This can also be explained by Theorem 1 or Theorem 3: the matrices V (f ; e, n − e) and W (f ; e, n − e) have not full column rank since they are e−1 i=0 n i × e i=0 n i matrices. From Theorem 3 the bounds on the immunity to fast algebraic attacks are related to the question whether the symmetric matrix W (f ; e) is invertible.
Before stating our main results, we list a useful lemma about the determinant of a symmetric matrix over a field with characteristic 2.
Lemma 4 Let A = (a ij ) m×m be a symmetric m×m matrix over a field with characteristic 2, and a ii = a 2 1i for 2 ≤ i ≤ m, that is,
If a 11 = (m + 1) mod 2, then det(A) = 0.
Proof. Let S m be the symmetric group of degree m. Then
If m is odd, then a 11 = 0 and therefore
If m is even, then a 11 = 1 and therefore
Remark 3. For the matrix A of Lemma 4 it holds that det(A) = det(A (1,1) ) if a 11 = m mod 2, where A (i,j) is the (m − 1) × (m − 1) matrix that results from A by removing the i-th row and the j-th column.
Theorem 5 Let f ∈ B n and f 2 n −1 be the coefficient of the monomial x 1 x 2 · · · x n in the ANF of f . Let e be a positive integer less than n/2. If f 2 n −1 = n−1 e + 1 mod 2, then there exists g = 0 with degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e − 1.
Proof. According to Theorem 3 we need to prove that the square matrix W (f ; e) is singular when f 2 n −1 = n−1 e + 1 mod 2. Let W ij be the ij-th element of W (f ; e). Since 1 = (1, 1, · · · , 1) and 0 = (0, 0, · · · , 0) are the first elements in W n−e−1 and W e respectively, by the definition of W (f ; e) we have W 11 = w 1,0 = f 2 n −1 . Because n i matrix over F 2 . We wish to show that W (f ; e) has the form of (5) . By the definition of W (f ; e) we have W 2 1i = W 1i = w 1z = f 1∩z = fz = fz ∩z = wz z = W ii wherez is the i-th element in W n−e−1 and z is the i-th element in W e . It follows from Lemma 4 that the matrix W (f ; e) is singular.
Corollary 6
Let n be an even number and f ∈ B n . If f is balanced, then there exists a non-zero function g with degree at most 1 such that the product gf has degree at most n − 2.
Proof. If f is balanced, then f 2 n −1 = 0. For even n, it holds that n−1 1 + 1 ≡ 0(mod 2). Therefore the result follows from Theorem 5.
From Corollary 6 it seems that for the number n of input variables, odd numbers are better than even ones from a cryptographic point of view (since cryptographic functions must be balanced).
Lucas' theorem states that for positive integers m and i, the following congruence relation holds: Note that f 2 n −1 = 1 if and only if deg(f ) = n. Theorem 5 shows that for an n-variable function f of degree n and e ⊂ n − 1, there is a non-zero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e − 1, and that for an n-variable function f of degree less than n and e ⊂ n − 1, there is a non-zero function g of degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e − 1.
For the case n − 1 / ∈ {2 s , 2 s − 1}, there are integers e, e * with 0 < e, e * < n/2 such that e ⊂ n − 1 and e * ⊂ n − 1, and thus an n-variable function is not PAI. This shows that for a PAI function the number n of input variables is 2 s + 1 or 2 s . For n = 2 s + 1 (resp. 2 s ), it holds that e ⊂ n − 1 (resp. e ⊂ n − 1) for positive integer e < n/2, and thus an n-variable function with degree equal to n (resp. less than n) is not PAI. Recall that a function on odd number of variables with maximum AI is always balanced [11] . For n = 2 s + 1, a PAI function is balanced, since it has maximum AI. For n = 2 s , a PAI function has degree n and is then unbalanced, since a function has an odd Hamming weight if and only if it has degree n. Consequently the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 7
Let f ∈ B n be a perfect algebraic immune function. Then n is one more than or equal to a power of 2. Further, if f is balanced, then n is one more than a power of 2; if f is unbalanced, then n is a power of 2.
The immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks using univariate polynomial representation
In this section we focus on the immunity of Boolean functions against fast algebraic attacks using univariate polynomial representation and show that the bounds presented in Section 3 can be achieved.
Recall that W e is the set {x ∈ F n 2 | wt(x) ≤ e} in lexicographic order and W d is the set {x ∈ F n 2 | wt(x) ≥ d+1} in reverse lexicographic order. Hereinafter, an element z = (z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n ) in W e or W d is considered as an integer z 1 + z 2 2 + · · · + z n 2 n−1 from 0 to 2 n − 1, and the operations "+" and "−" may be considered as addition and subtraction operations modulo 2 n − 1 respectively if there is no ambiguity.
Let f , g and h be n-variable Boolean functions, and let g be a function of algebraic degree at most e (e < n/2) satisfying that h = gf has algebraic degree at most d (e ≤ d). Let
h y x y , h y ∈ F 2 n be the univariate polynomial representations of f , g and h respectively. For y ∈ W d , we have h y = 0 and thus
The above equations on g z 's are homogeneous linear. Denote by U (f ; e, d) the coefficient matrix of the equations, which is a n i=d+1 n i × e i=0 n i matrix with the ij-th element equal to
where y is the i-th element in W d and z is the j-th element in W e . More precisely, for (i, j) = (1, 1) we have (y, z) = (2 n −1, 0) and u yz = f 2 n −1 ; for (i, j) = (1, 1) we have y −z ∈ {0, 2 n −1} and u yz = f (y−z) mod(2 n −1) when e ≤ d.
If the matrix U (f ; e, d) has full column rank, i.e., the rank of U (f ; e, d) equals the number of g z 's, then f admits no non-zero function g of algebraic degree at most e such that h = gf has algebraic degree at most d.
If the matrix U (f ; e, d) has not full column rank, then there always exists a non-zero Boolean function g(x) satisfying Equations (6). More precisely, if g(x) = z∈We g z x z (g z ∈ F 2 n ) satisfies (6), then
where f 2(2 n −1) = f 2 n −1 and f 2i is considered as f 2i mod(2 n −1) for i = 2 n − 1, showing that g 2 (x) = z∈We g 2 z x 2z mod(x 2 n − x) satisfies (8) . Note that (6) and (8) are actually the same equations. It shows that if g(x) satisfies Equations (6) then Tr(g(x)) satisfies Equations (6), where Tr(x) = x+x 2 +· · ·+x 2 n−1 . Also it follows that if g(x) satisfies Equations (6) then βg(x) and Tr(βg(x)) satisfy Equations (6) for any β ∈ F 2 k . If g(x) = 0, then there is c ∈ F 2 k such that g(c) = 0, and there is β ∈ F 2 k such that Tr(βg(c)) = 0 and thus Tr(βg(x)) = 0. Now we can see that Tr(βg(x)) is a non-zero Boolean function and satisfies (6) . Hence if there is a non-zero solution for (6), then there always exists a non-zero Boolean function g satisfying (6) .
Thus the following theorem is obtained.
Theorem 8 Let f ∈ B n . Then there exists no non-zero function g of degree at most e such that the product gf has degree at most d if and only if the matrix U (f ; e, d) has full column rank.
Remark 4. The theorem shows that AI(f ) > e if and only if the matrix U (f ; e, e) has full column rank (since AI(f ) > e if and only if there exists no non-zero function g of degree at most e such that h = gf has degree at most e). Then AI(f ) = Remark 5. The matrix U (f ; e, n − e − 1), denoted by U (f ; e), is symmetric since
Further, we have
and therefore U (f ; e) has the form of (5). Hence Theorem 5 can also be derived from Theorem 8 and Lemma 4.
Carlet-Feng functions
The class of the Carlet-Feng functions were first presented in [13] and further studied by C. Carlet and K. Feng [6] . Such functions have maximum algebraic immunity and good nonlinearity. It was observed through computer experiments by Armknecht's algorithm [2] that the functions also have good behavior against fast algebraic attacks. In [26] , P. Rizomiliotis determined the immunity of the Carlet-Feng functions against fast algebraic attacks by computing the linear complexity of a sequence, which is more efficient than Armknecht's algorithm but is not yet feasible for large n. In this section, we further discuss the immunity of the Carlet-Feng functions against fast algebraic attacks and prove that the functions achieve the bounds of Theorem 5.
Let n be an integer and α a primitive element of F 2 n . Let f ∈ B n and
Then AI(f ) = n 2 according to [13, 6] . As a matter of fact, the support of the function f (α l+2 n−1 x) + 1 is {0, 1, α, · · · , α 2 n−1 −2 }, which is the Carlet-Feng function. It means that these functions are affine equivalent.
A similar proof of [6, Theorem 2] applies to the following result. Here we give a proof for selfcompleteness.
Proposition 9 Let
be the univariate representation of the function f of (9). Then f 0 = 0, f 2 n −1 = 0, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 n − 2,
Hence the algebraic degree of f is equal to n − 1.
Proof. We have f 0 = f (0) = 0 and f 2 n −1 = 0 since f has even Hamming weight and thus algebraic degree less than n. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 n − 2, by Equality (2) we have
We can see that f 2 n −2 = 0 and therefore f has algebraic degree n − 1.
Remark 6. For the function f of (9), the ij-th element of the matrix U (f ; e, d) with e ≤ d is equal to
where y is the i-th element in W d and z is the j-th element in W e .
Lemma 10 Let A be an m × m matrix with the ij-th element a ij = (1 + β i γ j ) −1 in a field K of characteristic 2, β i , γ j ∈ K and β i γ j = 1, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Then the determinant of A is equal to
Furthermore, the determinant of A is non-zero if and only if β i = β j and γ i = γ j for i = j.
Proof. The second half part of this lemma is derived from the first half part. The proof of the first half part is given by induction on m. First we can check that the statement is certainly true for m = 1. Now we verify the induction step. Suppose that it holds for m − 1. Thus we suppose that
where A (i,j) is the (m − 1) × (m − 1) matrix that results from A by removing the i-th row and the j-th column. We wish to show that it also holds for m. Let B = (b ij ) m×m with b 1j = a 1j and for i > 1,
and
where diag(x 1 , · · · , x m ) denotes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries starting in the upper left corner are x 1 , · · · , x m . Then
It has now been proved by mathematical induction that the first half part of this lemma holds for all positive integers m.
Lemma 11 Proposition 12 Let e be a positive integer less than n/2 and f be the function of (9) . Then U (f ; e) is invertible if n−1 e ≡ 0(mod 2), and U (f ; e, n − e − 2) has full column rank if n−1 e ≡ 1(mod 2).
Proof. Let U = U (f ; e) and U ij be the ij-th element of U . We have U 11 = f 2 n −1 = 0. By Remark 5 we know that U is a symmetric matrix of order e i=0 n i in the form of (5). For the case n−1 e mod 2 = 0, we have e i=0 n i mod 2 = 0 = U 11 . By Remark 3 it holds that det(U ) = det(U (1,1) ). Remark 6 shows that the ij-th element of U (1,1) is
where y is the i-th element in W n−e−1 \ {2 n − 1} and z is the j-th element in W e \ {0}, since e ≤ n − e − 1 for e < n/2. Let U * be a ( Since α −y/2 = α −y /2 for y = y (y, y ∈ W n−e−1 \ {2 n − 1}) and α z/2 = α z /2 for z = z (z, z ∈ W e \ {0}), from Lemma 10 we have det(U * ) = 0. Then by Lemma 11 it holds that det(U (1,1) ) = 0. Hence, U is invertible.
For the case n−1 e mod 2 = 1, we consider the e+1 i=0 n i × e i=0 n i matrix U (f ; e, n − e − 2). For even n, we always have e ≤ n − e − 2 for e < n/2. For odd n, we always have e ≤ n − e − 2 for e ≤ (n − 3)/2 and n−1 e mod 2 = 0 for e = (n − 1)/2. Thus for n−1 e mod 2 = 1 and e < n/2, we always have e ≤ n − e − 2. Let U * * be the rows. A similar proof of det(U (1,1) ) = 0 also applies to det(U * * ) = 0. Then U (f ; e, n − e − 2) has full column rank.
Theorem 13
Let e be a positive integer less than n/2 and f be the function of (9) . Then f admits no non-zero function g with degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e − 1 if n−1 e ≡ 0(mod 2), and admits no non-zero function g with degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e − 2 if n−1 e ≡ 1(mod 2).
Proof. It is derived from Theorem 8 and Proposition 12.
Corollary 14 Let n = 2 s + 1 and f ∈ B n be the function of (9) . Then f is PAI.
Proof. It is obtained from Theorem 13 since
e ≡ 0(mod 2) for 1 ≤ e < n/2.
Theorem 13 states that the Carlet-Feng functions achieve the bounds of Theorem 5 and thus the bounds of Theorem 5 are tight for the functions with algebraic degree less than n, while Corollary 14 states that the Carlet-Feng functions on 2 s + 1 variables are PAI.
Next we consider the Boolean functions with algebraic degree equal to n. Let n be an integer and α a primitive element of F 2 n . Let f ∈ B n and
The function (10) is a function that results from the function (9) by flipping the output at x = 0. A similar proof of Proposition 9 applies to the following result.
Proposition 15 Let
be the univariate representation of the function f of (10). Then f 0 = 1, f 2 n −1 = 1, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 n − 2,
Hence the algebraic degree of f is equal to n.
A similar proof of Proposition 12 also applies to the following result.
Proposition 16
Let e be a positive integer less than (n−1)/2 and f be the function of (10) . Then U (f ; e) is invertible if n−1 e ≡ 1(mod 2), and U (f ; e, n − e − 2) has full column rank if n−1 e ≡ 0(mod 2).
Theorem 17 Let e be a positive integer less than (n − 1)/2 and f be the function of (10) . Then f admits no non-zero function g with degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n−e−1 if n−1 e ≡ 1(mod 2), and admits no non-zero function g with degree at most e such that gf has degree at most n − e − 2 if n−1 e ≡ 0(mod 2).
Proof. It is confirmed by Theorem 8 and Proposition 16.
Corollary 18
Let n = 2 s and f ∈ B n be the function of (10). Then f is PAI.
Proof. It is obtained from Theorem 17 since
Theorem 17 states that the modified Carlet-Feng functions achieve the bounds of Theorem 5 and thus the bounds of Theorem 5 are tight for the functions with algebraic degree equal to n, while Corollary 18 states that the modified Carlet-Feng functions on 2 s variables are PAI. Here we do not consider the case e = (n − 1)/2 for odd n, since the algebraic immunity of an n-variable Boolean function with algebraic degree n is less than or equal to (n − 1)/2 for odd n.
Consequently, as mentioned above, the bounds of Theorem 5 are tight and there exist PAI functions on 2 s and 2 s + 1 variables. More precisely, there exist n-variable PAI functions with degree n − 1 (balanced functions) if and only if n = 2 s + 1; there exist n-variable PAI functions with degree n (unbalanced functions) if and only if n = 2 s .
The immunity of Boolean functions with maximum AI against probabilistic algebraic attacks
This section mainly focuses on the time complexities of probabilistic algebraic attacks on an LFSR-based nonlinear filter generator with the filter function achieving maximum AI. Let p be the probability for S4a or S4b (see Section 1). Then an overdetermined system of nonlinear equations with degree r is obtained where each equation holds with probability p. One can use the linearization algorithm to solve the system, where R = r i=0 L i equations are used and hold with probability p R . Then the time complexity of probabilistic algebraic attacks is p −R R w , where w ≈ 2.807 is the exponent of the Gaussian reduction.
In the affine case, probabilistic algebraic attacks are related to the (fast) correlation attacks [3] , so we always consider the nonlinear case here. Recall that the maximum AI of an n-variable function is n 2 . Then, for the case r ≥ n 2 , deterministic algebraic attacks can be used. Therefore hereinafter we always assume that 2 ≤ r ≤ n 2 − 1. Let g be a non-zero function with degree at most r. For a balanced function we know that the maximum probability for applying S4a or S4b is n − r i .
Since AI(f ) ≤ n 2 , we have 2AI(f ) − 2r − 1 < n − r and therefore for r ≤ AI(f ) − 1, Then for a function with maximum AI we have d r ≥ 2 n−2r−2 and therefore
It is well known that the real function 1 − x − e −x is decreasing when x ≥ 0. Hence we have 
where H 2 (µ) = −µ log 2 µ − (1 − µ) log 2 (1 − µ). For L/5 < r < L/2, it follows that 
From (11) and (12) we can calculate that for L ≥ 46,
Consequently, probabilistic algebraic attacks are worse than exhaustive key search in the context of their application to the nonlinear filter generator if the filter function achieves maximum AI and the size L of the LFSR is greater than or equal to 46. Since a PAI function has maximum AI, the function also behaves good against probabilistic algebraic attacks. As a matter of fact, a similar proof shows that for practical sizes L (e.g. L = 256) of the LFSR and reasonable number n of input variables, probabilistic algebraic attacks are worse than exhaustive key search if the AI of the filter function is a little smaller than the maximum value n 2 .
Conclusion
In this paper, several open problems about the immunity of Boolean functions against algebraic attacks have been solved. We proved the maximum immunity to fast algebraic attacks, identified the immunity of the Carlet-Feng functions against fast algebraic attacks, and evaluated the resistance of Boolean functions with maximum algebraic immunity against probabilistic algebraic attacks. It seems that for a balanced function the optimal value of the number n of input variables is 2 s + 1 in terms of immunity against fast algebraic attacks. The Carlet-Feng functions previously shown to have maximum algebraic immunity and good nonlinearity are proved to be optimal against fast algebraic attacks among the balanced functions. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that a function is shown to have such cryptographic property.
